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Bandics: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements

COMMENT
TOWARD A FUTURE OF
ENFORCEMENT:
A CRITIQUE OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT'S INVALIDATION OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS
INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are searching for a job. As you scan for
job listings in the morning paper, you notice an article about
the monthly employment report issued by the United States
Department of Labor.l The report reveals that nine million
American workers are unemployed, just like you. 2 Of the nine
million jobless workers, just over two million reported that they
have been searching for work for six months or longer. 3 The
article also points out that workers who remain unemployed for
extended periods of time tend to accept positions that pay less

1 See, e.g., MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, NovemberlDecember, 2003, at 93, Table 4,
available at http://stats.bls.gov/news.releaselempsittOI.htm (last visited March 5, 2004).
2 For example, the unemployment rate for the month of September 2003 was
6.1%, which correlates to approximately nine million Americans without jobs. Id.
3 Of the nine million persons unemployed as of September 2003, 2.1 million
reported that they had been looking for work for 27 weeks or longer. Id. at 95, Table 7,
available at http://stats.bls.gov/news.releaselempsitt09.htm (last visited March 5, 2004).
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than previously held positions.4 You understand; you have not
received a paycheck in six months.
Later that same day, you are offered a job that pays a salary higher than you have ever earned. There is only one condition: before you may accept the employer's offer, you must sign
a mandatory arbitration agreement. The agreement requires
you to arbitrate future workplace disputes instead of bringing
your claims in court. The employer explains that the agreement covers any claims that may arise out of your employment
relationship, including violations of your civil rights. Would
you sign the arbitration agreement to secure the job? Or would
you reject a steady paycheck to preserve the right to your day
in court?
On the eve of a recession that left nine million American
workers jobless,s the United States Supreme Court held that
the Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter "FAA") applies to employment contracts. S To the American worker, this means that
under the FAA, employers may require prospective employees
to sign agreements to arbitrate disputes that arise out of the
employment relationship, including state and federal statutory
claims of employment discrimination. 7 Of course, employers
offer applicants a choice: arbitrate, or return to the want ads. s

4 Jon E. Hilsenrath, 'Jobless'Recovery Feels a Lot Like a Recession, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE (October 3, 2003), at http://www.careeljoumaLcom/salaryhiringlhotissues/200306IOhilsenrath.html (last visited March 5, 2004).
5 The current recession began in March 2001. Id.
6 The U.S. Supreme Court decided Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119
(2001) on March 21, 2001, on the eve of the current recession. See id. The FAA refers
to the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213 §1, 43 Stat. 883. The FAA was reenacted in 1947 as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947). Current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
7 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 119 (holding the FAA governs the
arbitration clauses in a Circuit City job application, which the prospective employee
was required to execute before being considered for employment).
8 Arbitration is a process by which a dispute is submitted to one or more impartial persons, called arbitrators, for a final and binding decision. American Arbitration
Ass'n,
AAA
Glossary
of Dispute
Resolution
Terms,
available
at
http://www.adr.orglindex2.I.jsp?JSPssid=IS784 (last visited February 23, 2004).
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When the arbitration agreement is contained in a take-it-orleave-it employment contract, however, the decision to "take it"
will rarely be truly voluntary, particularly when jobs are difficult to obtain.9
This Comment focuses on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements that prospective employees must sign in order
to be hired, or even considered, for a given position. Growing
numbers of employers are implementing mandatory arbitration
programs to resolve workplace disputes in response to recent
case law upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements. IO Employers may present arbitration agreements in
employment contracts, employment handbooks, or in job applications. l l This Comment posits that while arbitration is an
efficient method of adjudicating many claims, mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts are potentially
unfair to employees for three reasons. These three concerns
arise because employers typically control the terms on which
most employees are hired. 12
The first concern arises where employers require employees to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. This means that if the applicant wants to accept an employer's job offer, then she must also accept the arbitration

9 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS.
L. REV. 33, 131 (1997) ("unless the adherent has a meaningful opportunity to bargain
or shop [the arbitration] term, she may feel compelled to accept it .... ").
10 G. Roger King and Rob Edmund, Mandatory Employment Arbitration Agree·
ments: As More Employers Weigh Their Costs and Benefits, Courts Remain Divided
Over Enforceability of Key Provisions, 9 No. 4 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL PRACTICE AND
GUIDANCE 6, July/August 2003. For case law encouraging employers to implement
mandatory arbitration programs, see, for example, Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001) (upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the employment context).
11 U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC Notice Number
915.002, Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment (July 10, 1997), at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docslmandarb.html(last visited March 5, 2004) !hereinafter
EEOC Notice].
12 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83,
115 (2000) ("in the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic pressure
exerted by employers on all but the most sought after employees may be particularly
acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment .... ").
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agreement on the employer's terms. Because most employees
lack the bargaining power to negotiate or reject unfavorable
terms, such agreements may be considered procedurally unconscionable. 13 Second, in operation, arbitration agreements often
compel only employees to give up the right to bring future
claims in court because employers are unlikely to initiate typiSuch
cal employment-related suits against employees. 14
15
agreements are unfairly one-sided.
Finally, employers who
enjoy superior bargaining power may impose arbitration provisions that restrict employees' statutory rights. Such provisions
may be considered substantively unconscionable. 16 To illustrate how these fairness concerns affect employees, this Comment sets forth the approaches taken by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court in assessing the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements in
employment contracts. 17
In Part I,18 this Comment provides the backdrop against
which the United States Supreme Court decided Circuit City v.
Adams II (hereinafter "Adams IF') , a landmark decision upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements in the em-

13 Under California law, unconscionability refers to "an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unrea·
sonably favorable to the other party." A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App.
3d 473, 486 (1982). The defmition of unconscionability implicates two distinct aspects
of unconscionability: procedural and substantive. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114.
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the process of contract formation, and the
extent to which the stronger party used its superior bargaining position to oppress the
weaker party. [d. Substantive unconscionability focuses on whether the terms of the
contract produce "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results. [d. A contract is unenforceable
under California law if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable,
though the elements need not be present to the same degree. [d. For examples of cases
finding arbitration agreements procedurally unconscionable, see Armendariz, 24 Cal.
4'" at 114-115; Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9 th Cir. 2002); Circuit City v.
Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9 th Cir. 2003); Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107
(9 th Cir. 2003). Cf Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit
City v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1106, 1108, n.2 (9'" Cir. 2002) (finding no showing of procedural
unconscionability where employees had the opportunity to opt out of the arbitration
program).
th
14 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9 Cir. 2003).
15 See id.
16 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 90. See supra note 13 for a definition of
substantive unconscionability.
17 See infra notes 154-229 and accompanying text for discussion of Ninth Circuit
cases. See infra notes 230-278 and accompanying text for discussion of the California
Supreme Court case, Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4'" 83.
18 See infra notes 23-153 and accompanying text.
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ployment context. 19 Part II examines Ninth Circuit decisions in
the aftermath of Adams II, which applied the doctrine of unconscionability under California contract law to invalidate compulsory arbitration agreements, in spite of the pro-arbitration
mandate of Adams II.20 Part III considers the California Supreme Court's approach to assessing unconscionability in the
employment arbitration case, Armendariz u. Foundation
Health Psychcare Seruices. 2i Part IV compares the two approaches, and recommends changes to the Ninth Circuit's current approach to assessing unconscionability claims. 22 Last,
Part V concludes that the Ninth Circuit should adopt the recommended approaches in order to balance the preservation of
employees' rights with a policy encouraging voluntary arbitration as an effective method of resolving employment disputes.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS IMPLICATE COMPETING FEDERAL CONCERNS:
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND TITLE VII

Mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts often implicate two federal policies that affect employment relationships.23 On one hand, the FAA represents a federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 24 On the other hand, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (hereinafter "Title VII") prohibits employment discrimina19 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). In the main text, this Comme~t
refers to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001), as Adams II. In Adams II, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), referred to herein as
Adams I. Following its decision in Adams II, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent its opinion. This Comment
refers to the remand, Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002), as Adams Ill.
20 See infra notes 154-229 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 230-278 and accompanying text. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th 83
(2000).
22 See infra notes 279-344 and accompanying text.
23 See, generally, King and Edmund, supra note 10 (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), confirmed that
arbitration agreements between employees and employers are enforceable under the
FAA, and reaffirmed that employees can be required to arbitrate employment disputes,
including statutory discrimination claims under Title VII ).
24 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
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tion and gives victims of workplace discrimination the right to
sue offending employers in federal COurt. 25 Mandatory arbitration agreements create tension between these two federal policies by requiring employees to arbitrate, rather than litigate,
their Title VII claims. 26 The tension between the FAA and Title
VII is exacerbated by concerns that arbitration procedures do
not allow employees to fully vindicate the civil rights that Title
VII protects. 27 Any attempt to reconcile the FAA's policy favoring arbitration with the protection of employees' Title VII
rights, however, must also account for the advantages that employees gain by arbitrating employment disputes. 28
1.

The FAA's Pro-Arbitration Mandate

Employers that require employees sign mandatory predispute arbitration agreements as part of the hiring process
may rely on the FAA to enforce employees' obligations to arbitrate employment-related claims. 29 Prior to the enactment of
the FAA, judges frequently refused to enforce arbitration
agreements because such agreements deprived the courts of
jurisdiction.30 In 1925, Congress passed the FAA to quell "judicial hostility" to arbitration and to ensure that courts would
enforce private arbitration agreements.31 In addition, Congress
hoped to encourage arbitration as an alternative to trial in or-

25 Title VII, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, P.L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (unlawful employment practices); id. § 2000e-5 (O(1)(A) (2000)
(civil action by person aggrieved).
26 See, e.g., EEOC Notice, supra note 11. ("The imposition of mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of employment substitutes a private dispute resolution
system for the public justice system intended by Congress to govern the enforcement of
the employment discrimination laws.").
27 See id. (taking the position that agreements requiring employees to arbitrate
workplace discrimination claims as a condition of employment are contrary to the principles embodied in these civil rights laws).
28 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 122-123 (endorsing the "real benefits" of enforcing arbitration agreements in the employment context).
29 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 119 (holding that the FAA applies
to arbitration agreements in employment contracts).
30 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 n.6 (1985) (referring to
the House Report accompanying the FAA, H.R. REp. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924».
31 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (citing Dean
Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 219-220 n.6).
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der to ease the burdens of crowded court dockets and high litigation costS. 32
To accomplish its goals, the FAA makes arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts. 33 Section 2 of the
FAA provides in part:
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. 34

In addition to requiring courts to enforce arbitration
agreements to the same extent as any other contract, the FAA
also provides a remedy to bring about enforcement. 35 If an employee who is a party to a valid arbitration agreement refuses
to arbitrate her claims, § 4 of the FAA authorizes the employerparty to request an order compelling arbitration from a United
States district court. 36 Similarly, if an employee opposing arbitration ignores the arbitration agreement and files her claims
in court, § 3 of the FAA allows her employer to ask the court to
delay trial proceedings pending arbitration of any claims covered by the agreement. 37 Doubts as to whether an agreement
covers specific claims are to be resolved by courts in favor of
arbitration. 38
32 Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220 (referring to the House Report accompanying the Federal Arbitration Act, H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924».
33 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n.12 (1967).
34 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
35 Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 220 n.6.
36
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition
any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.").
37 [d. § 3 ("If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement,
shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.").
38 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
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In addition to overcoming judicial hostility to arbitration in
the federal courts, Congress enacted the . FAA to supplement
state arbitration statutes. 39 The existing state statutes provided arbitration procedures but did not require state courts to
enforce private arbitration contracts. 40 To fill in the gaps in
these statutes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA requires state courts as well as federal courts to enforce arbitration clauses. 41 Accordingly, the FAA governs all claims covered
by the arbitration agreement, whether based on federal or state
law. 42 The U.S. Supreme Court further held that Congress precluded the states from requiring a judicial forum for claims
that parties agreed to settle by arbitration. 43 As a result, the
FAA preempts state laws that treat arbitration provisions less
favorably than other contract provisions. 44 Thus, employees
may not avoid arbitration by bringing their claims in state
court as opposed to federal COurt.45

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
[d.
41 [d. at 15-16.
42 See id. at 17 (holding arbitrable a claim based on California Franchise InvestmentLaw).
43 [d. at 10.
44 [d. at 16 n.9.
Preemption is "[tJhe principle (derived from the Supremacy
Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or
regulation. Also termed federal preemption." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1197 (7th ed.
1999).
45 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 ("We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the
intent . . . to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right
dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted. And since
the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts,
we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject
only to federal court jurisdiction.").
39
40
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Implications of Arbitrating Title VII Claims

The U.S. Supreme Court interprets the FAA as Congress's
declaration that federal policy favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 46 In spite of this policy, mandatory arbitration agreements imposed as a condition of employment still
give rise to litigation over their enforceability.47 Litigation persists around the widely held concern that arbitration procedures differ from judicial proceedings in ways that may prevent
employees from fully vindicating civil rights guaranteed to
them by state and federal statutes. 48 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC"), as the federal
agency in charge of enforcing federal employment discrimination laws, recognizes the legitimacy of this concern. 49 The
EEOC takes the position that agreements requiring employees
to arbitrate workplace discrimination claims as a condition of
employment are contrary to the principles embodied in these
civil rights laws. 50
Title VII provides an example of a federal civil rights statute, enacted to protect each individual's rights to enjoy equal
employment opportunities and to be free from discrimination in
the workplace. 5 ! The civil rights protected by Title VII "flow
directly from core Constitutional principles," such as the fundamental right to be accorded the equal protection of the laws. 52
Title VII ensures equal employment opportunities by setting
forth uniform federal standards of discriminatory employment
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
See American Arbitration Ass'n, AAA National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment
Disputes,
available
at
http://www.adr.orglindex2.I.jsp?lSPssid= 15747 &JSPsrc=upload\LIVESITE\Rules_Procedures\Nati
onal_intemational\.. \..\focusArea\employment\AAA 121 current.html (last visited February 24,
2004) [hereinafter AAA Rules].
48 See, e.g., EEOC Notice, supra note 11.
49 See id.
50 Id.
5! See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (unlawful employment practices).
52 EEOC Notice, supra note 11; U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
46
47
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practices. 53 To enforce these standards, Title VII establishes
the right to bring an action in federal court for employees who
have been the victims of illegal discriminatory action by their
employers. 54 Thus, both federal courts and individual employees playa part in Title VII's enforcement scheme. 55
Federal courts play a vital role in enforcing Title VII and
other federal employment discrimination statutes "through the
construction and interpretation of the statutes, the adjudication of claims, and the issuance of relief. "56 Federal courts interpret anti-discrimination laws and publish written decisions. 57 These decisions are exposed to public scrutiny and are
subject to correction by higher courts and Congress. 58 Thus, the
courts assure that the anti-discrimination laws are applied in
accordance with their purpose, to ensure equal opportunity in
employment.59 The public nature of these decisions also exposes employers' discriminatory practices to public consternation and deters future violations of civil rights laws.60
In order that courts may fulfill their role in enforcing Title
VII, individual employees must have access to the judicial forum to assert their claims. 61 Title VII grants this right of action to aggrieved employees. 62 By bringing claims to court, individual plaintiffs vindicate both their own interests and the
public's interest in exposing discriminatory practices and deterring future civil rights violations.53 In the Civil Rights Act of
1991 (hereinafter "the 1991 Act"), Congress reaffirmed the key
role of individual litigants by amending Title VII to provide

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e·2(a) (2000).
See id. § 2000e-5(O(1).
55 See, e.g., EEOC Notice, supra note II.
56 Id. (citing Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 454 U.S. 461, 479 n.20
(982)("federal courts were entrusted with ultimate enforcement responsibility" of Title
VII.)).
6 7 Id.
68 Id.
69Id.
60 Id.
61Id.
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O (2000).
63 EEOC Notice, supra note 11.
63

54
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additional remedies and protections to victims of dis crimination. 64 For the first time in Title VII's history, the 1991 Act explicitly provided victims of discrimination with the right to a
jury trial as one of these additional protections. 65 Congress
passed the 1991 Act to strengthen Title VII in response to findings that U.S. Supreme Court decisions had eroded the statute's civil rights protections. 66
Viewed in light of the 1991 Act's purpose of strengthening
Title VII, arbitration procedures are arguably inconsistent with
the goals and framework of Title VII as amended. The arbitration of Title VII claims may undermine the policy goals underlying the statute by removing civil rights claims from the public forum of our nation's courtS. 67 Arbitration is a private
method of dispute resolution. 68 Arbitral decisions are binding
only upon the parties who hired the arbitrator.69 Arbitrators
are not accountable to the public even if their interpretations of
Title VII conflict with the public's interest in exposing and
remedying discrimination in the workplace. 70 Moreover, employers who are found to practice discrimination are shielded
from public criticism. 71 This lack of public disclosure weakens
the deterrence function of Title VII.72 As a result, the private
nature of arbitration means that the proceedings are less likely
to advance the public policies underlying the statute. 73
In addition to potentially undermining the broad social
policies of Title VII, arbitration proceedings differ from judicial
proceedings in ways that may adversely affect the fair resolution of individual employees' claims. First, employees asserting
Title VII claims may opt to have juries hear and resolve their

64

The Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, §§ 2-3, reprinted in notes 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 (2000).

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000).
Specifically, Congress found that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections. See P.L. 102-166, § 2, reprinted in notes to 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
67 EEOC Notice, supra note 11.
68 [d.
69 [d.
70 See id. ("The nature of the arbitral process allows ... for minimal, if any, public accountability of arbitrators or arbitral decision-making.").
71 [d.
72 [d.
73 EEOC Notice, supra note 11.
65

66
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claims. 74 Commentators view courts and juries as "more likely
to adhere to the law, and less likely than arbitrators to 'split
the difference' between the two sides, thereby lowering damages awards for plaintiffs."75 In the arbitration process, however, a jury trial is not an option. 76 Second, the arbitrator conducting the proceedings may be biased in favor of "repeat
player" employers who have previously arbitrated employment
disputes. 77 Such employers are better aware of arbitrators' past
decisions, while less experienced employees may be unable to
make an informed selection of arbitrators. 78 Third, arbitration
rules often limit the amount of discovery each party is allowed,
or leave to the arbitrator decisions regarding the scope of discovery.79 Limitations on discovery may make it difficult for
employees to obtain from employers the documents and information necessary to prove employment discrimination claims.80
Fourth, the arbitrator may not be required to issue a written
opinion stating the reasons for his decisions, which limits the
extent to which arbitral decisions are subject to judicial review. 81 As a result, higher courts and Congress often cannot
scrutinize and correct arbitral decisions. 82

[d. See also, 42 u.s.c. § 1981a(c) (2000) (jury trial).
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 119
(2000) (citing Robert Haig, Corporate Counsel's Guide: Legal Development Report on
Cost-Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, in FEDERAL PRETRIAL PRACTICE,
PROCEDURE AND STRATEGY, at 177, 186-187 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 610, 1999)).
76 EEOC Notice, supra note 11.
77 [d. See also, Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 115 (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189
(1997)).
78 EEOC Notice, supra note 11.
79 See, e.g., AAA Rules, supra note 47. Rule 7, relating to discovery, states: "The
arbitrator shall have the authority to order such discovery._.as the arbitrator considers
necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with the
expedited nature of arbitration." [d. Discovery refers to "compulsory disclosure, at a
party's request, of information that relates to the litigation. The primary discovery
devices are interrogatories, depositions, requests for admissions, and requests for production." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 478 (7th ed. 1999).
80 See EEOC Notice, supra note 11.
81 [d. Judicial review refers to "a court's review of a lower court's or an administrative body's factual or legal findings." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 852 (7 th ed. 1999).
82 EEOC Notice, supra note 11.
74

75
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In spite of the potential negative implications of arbitrating Title VII claims, the U.S. Supreme Court held that these
attacks on arbitration procedures are insufficient to render an
arbitration agreement unenforceable. 83 Such attacks "rest on
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants," and they are "far out of step with [the Court's] current
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes."84 Nor is the frequent presence of
unequal bargaining power between employer and employee an
adequate basis for finding an arbitration agreement unenforceable in the employment context. 85 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, most federal and "parallel" state statutory
claims, including employment discrimination claims, may be
the subjects of an enforceable arbitration agreement contained
in an employment contract. 86 Potential plaintiffs are free to
waive rights conferred by statute, because "[b]y agreeing to
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum."87 The assumption that a litigant will be able to fully and effectively vindicate her statutory claim, albeit in an arbitral forum, is a primary justification for the U.S. Supreme Court's current endorsement of the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 88
Fairness concerns notwithstanding, employees may opt to
arbitrate their claims in order to take advantage of the benefits
associated with arbitration. 89 Arbitration allows both parties to
a dispute to avoid the high costs oflitigation. 90 Moreover, arbi83 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991).
[d. (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAm. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989)).
85 [d. at 33.
86 See id. at 26 (listing cases standing for the proposition that various types of
statutory claims may be the subject of an enforceable arbitration agreement: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); ShearsonlAm.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477).
87 Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
88 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
89 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001) ("For parties to employment contracts ... there are real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions.").
90 See id. at 123.
84
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tration proceedings are less formal than court proceedings and
thus may provide swifter resolution of claims.91 Employees of
average means are in a better position to assert their claims
when costs and burdens are minimized, particularly because
employment litigation may involve claims for small amounts of
money.92 Commentators also urge that arbitration agreements
increase employees' access to a forum to settle their disputes
because lower costs and decreased time expenditure make it
easier for would-be plaintiffs to secure attorney representation. 93 Thus, the availability of an arbitral forum increases the
likelihood that employees will be equipped to assert their
claims. 94
Employees considering whether to accept an employer's arbitration agreement should be aware that arbitration might harbor both benefits and shortcomings when it
comes to resolving their civil rights claims.
B.

NINTH CIRCUIT PRE-ADAMS II DECISIONS PROTECTED
EMPLOYEES FROM COMPELLED ARBITRATION OF TITLE VII
CLAIMS

Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City
v. Adams II,95 the Ninth Circuit frequently refused to enforce
arbitration provisions in employment contracts that sought to
compel employees to arbitrate Title VII employment discrimination claims. 96 For example, in Prudential Insurance Company v. Lai, the Ninth Circuit held that a Title VII plaintiff

See id.
See id.
93 See Edward A. Marshall, Title VII's Participation Clause and Circuit City
Stores v. Adams: Making the Foxes the Guardians of the Chickens, 24 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 96-97 (2003).
94 See id.
95 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
96 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9'" Cir. 1994); Duffield
v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Craft v. Campbell Soup
Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
91

92
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could only be forced to arbitrate claims she knowingly agreed to
submit to arbitration. 97 The contract at issue in Lai did not
specify the types of disputes the parties agreed to arbitrate. 98
"[B]ecause they did not knowingly contract to forego their
statutory remedies in favor of arbitration," the court held that
the employee was not bound by a valid agreement to arbitrate
these employment disputes. 99
Similarly, in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., the
Ninth Circuit held that employees could not be required, as a
condition of employment, to waive the right to bring future Title VII claims in court. 100 The court found sufficient evidence
from the text and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to conclude that Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. lol One goal of the 1991 Act
was to strengthen Title VII by making it easier to bring and
prove lawsuits, and by increasing the available judicial remedies. l02 To augment plaintiffs' options, section 118 of the 1991
Act encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration, to resolve employment disputes. loa The
Ninth Circuit reasoned, however, that it would be paradoxical
for Congress to intend to strengthen Title VII, yet encourage
"the use of a process whereby employers condition employment
on their prospective employees' surrendering their rights to a
judicial forum for the resolution of all future claims of race or
sex discrimination."104 The court held that Congress intended
to encourage voluntary arbitration, but to preclude compulsory
arbitration of Title VII disputes. l05
97 Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305 (emphasis added). Knowingly means: "(1) having or showing awareness or understanding; well-informed. For example, a knowing waiver of the
right to counsel; (2) Deliberate; conscious." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 876 (7 th ed. 1999).
98 Lai, 42 F.3d at 1305.
99 [d. Other courts have disagreed. See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 99 n.7
(2000)(citing Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183-184 (3"' Cir. 1998) and
Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997), and declining to
decide whether the agreement notified employees they were required to arbitrate
statutory claims).
100 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190.
101 [d. at 1194 (referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166).
102 [d. at 1191 (citing H.R. REp. No. 102-40(1) at 30 (1991) and H.R. REP. No. 10240(11) at 1-4 (1991)).
103 See Pub. L. No. 102-166, §118, reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
104 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193.
105 [d. at 1193, 1202-1203. The Ninth Circuit, en bane, recently overruled Duffield in EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The following year in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., the
Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not apply to any labor or
employment contracts. 106 Craft, an employee of Campbell Soup
Company and a union member, filed a grievance with the union
alleging racial discrimination, harassment, health and safety
concerns, and other claims.107 Pursuant to a Collective Bargaining Agreement, Craft's claim, if not resolved by the grievance process, would be submitted to arbitration. 108 While his
grievance was pending, Craft filed suit in federal district court
alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of
Title VII, and state law claims for assault and emotional distress. 109 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ordered the arbitration of Craft's state law
claims, but held that Craft could not be compelled to arbitrate
his Title VII claims.ll0
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not
apply to the labor agreement that governed Craft's employment. ll1 At the time the FAA's coverage provision was drafted,
U.S. Supreme Court decisions had restricted the scope of Congress's commerce power.ll2 The Ninth Circuit determined that
in enacting the FAA, Congress could only have reached the
Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999). Surprisingly,
the question had never been previously resolved. [d. at 1090 ("neither this court nor
the Supreme Court has definitively ruled on whether the FAA applies to labor and
employment contracts.").
107 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1084.
108 [d. A collective-bargaining agreement as it is used in labor law, is "[al contract
that is made between an employer and a labor union and that regulates employment
conditions. Also termed collective labor agreement; trade agreement." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 257 (7 th ed. 1999).
109 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1084.
110 [d. The district court actually granted summary judgment in favor of Campbell Soup on Craft's state law claims. [d. at 1084 nA ("the court agrees Campbell's
motion for summary judgment is equivalent to motion to compel arbitration under 9
U.S.C. § 4."). Campbell Soup appealed that portion of the district court's decision. [d.
at 1084. Summary judgment is "[al judgment granted on a claim about which there is
no genuine issue of material fact and upon which the movant is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law. This procedural device allows the speedy disposition of a controversy
without the need for trial." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1449 (7 th ed. 1999).
111 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1094.
112 [d. at 1086-1087 (referring to Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918),
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Howard v. lllinois Cent. R.R.,
207 U.S. 463 (1908); United Leather Workers' Int'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk
Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924». "Commerce power" refers to the constitutional grant of
power to Congress "[tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8, cl. 3.
106
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employment contracts of workers who actually transported
people or goods in interstate commerce.1l3 Section 1 of the FAA
then exempted those same employment contracts from the
FAA's coverage. 1l4 The Ninth Circuit concluded, therefore, that
Congress did not intend the FAA to cover any employment contracts. 1l5 In Craft, the Ninth Circuit became the only federal
court of appeals to hold that the FAA did not govern arbitration
clauses in employment contracts.1l6
C.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT STEPS IN: CIRCUIT CITY V.
ADAMS I AND II

1.

Circuit City v. Adams I

In Circuit City u. Adams (hereinafter "Adams I"), Adams,
the plaintiff, completed and signed a portion of the Circuit City
job application, entitled Circuit City Dispute Resolution Agreement (hereinafter "DRA").ll7 The agreement required employees to submit all claims to mutually binding arbitration, and
was a mandatory prerequisite to employment with Circuit
CityYs Two years later, Adams filed an employment discrimination suit against Circuit City in state court, under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (hereinafter
"FEHA")Y9 Pursuant to the FAA, Circuit City filed suit in federal district court to stay the state court action and to compel
Craft, 177 F.3d at 1087. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
Craft, 177 F.3d at 1087 (9 th Cir. 1999). See also, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (containing
an exemption from the FAA's coverage: "but nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts for employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.").
115 Craft, 177 F.3d at 1087. See also, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) and supra note 114.
116 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109, 111 (2001) (citations omitted).
th
117 Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9 Cir. 1999).
118 Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d at 107l.
119 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110. The California Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA), CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West Supp. 2004). Unlawful
employment practices are set forth in CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 ( "It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or,
except where based upon applicable security regulations established by the United
States or the State of California: (a) For an employer, because of the race, religious
creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical
condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation of any person, to refuse to hire
or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training program leading to
employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from employment or from a training
program leading to employment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation
or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. ").
113
114
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Adams to arbitrate his claims.120 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of California held that the DRA
obligated Adams to submit to arbitration. 121
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and in light of its fresh
holding in Craft, the court reasoned that if the DRA was considered an employment contract, then the FAA did not apply.122
The court defined "employment contract" as "an agreement setting forth 'terms and conditions' of employment," and found
that the DRA met this definition. 123 In a brief per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to compel arbitration under the FAA, reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration, and remanded the
case for dismissal. 124
2.

Circuit City v. Adams II

Following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Adams I, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the question of whether the FAA applies to employment contracts. 125 In
Adams II, the U.S. Supreme Court held that § 1 of the FAA
exempts only the employment contracts of transportation
workers, not employment contracts in general. 126 In reaching
120 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110. A stay is "(1) the postponement or
halting of a proceeding, judgment, or (2) an order to suspend all or part of a judicial
proceeding or a judgment resulting from that proceeding." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1425 (7'" ed. 1999).
121 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110.
122 Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071. See also, Craft, 177 F.3d at 1094.
123 Circuit City v. Adams, 194 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Modzelewski v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1994».
124 Id. at 1072. A per curiam opinion is "an opinion handed down by an appellate
court without identifying the individual judge who wrote the opinion." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1119 (7'" ed. 1999).
125 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 110-111. A Writ of Certiorari is "an extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a lower court
to deliver the record in the case for review. The U.S. Supreme Court uses certiorari to
review most of the cases that it decides to hear." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 220 (7'" ed.
1999).
126 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 119. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) {"'Maritime
transactions,' as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading of water carriers,
agreements relating to wharfage, supplies furnished vessels or repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if the subject of controversy,
would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction; 'commerce,' as herein defined, means
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the
United States or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein
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this decision, the Court first rejected Adams's contention that
the word "transaction" in § 2 refers only to commercial transactions, therefore his employment contract was not a "contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce" within the meaning of the FAA's coverage provision. 127 The Court reasoned that
Adams's interpretation of § 2, which excluded all employment
contracts as beyond the scope of the FAA, would render meaningless the separate exemption in § 1 for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in interstate commerce. "128 Furthermore, the
Court previously interpreted the words "involving commerce"
in § 2 as expressing Congress's intention to legislate to the
broadest limits of the commerce power.129 For these reasons,
the Court concluded that the § 2 coverage provision is not limited to commercial deals, but rather is sufficiently broad to
reach employment contracts. 130 Therefore, any argument that
the FAA does not cover employment contracts would necessarily rely on the exemption contained in § l,131
Having decided that the arbitration provisions in Adams's
employment contract were governed by the FAA, the Court
went on to decide whether such contracts were removed from
the FAA's coverage by the exemption in § 1 for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class
of workers engaged in interstate commerce. "132 Adams argued
that the Court's broad interpretation of "involving commerce"
in § 2 brings within the scope of the FAA all contracts that
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.") (emphasis added).
127 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 113. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) ("A written
provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.") (emphasis
added).
128 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 113 (quoting Pennsylvania Dept. of Public
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) ("Our cases express a deep reluctance
to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the
same enactment."». See also, supra note 126 (text of9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000».
129 Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277 (1995).
130 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 113-114.
131Id.
132Id. at 114 (referring to 9 U.S.C. § 1).
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Congress had authority to regulate. 133 In turn, § 1 exempts all
employment contracts within that authority.134 To dispose of
this argument, the Court employed the statutory canon ejusdem generis, "[w]here general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words."135 The Court concluded
that the residual clause, "or any other class of workers engaged
in interstate commerce," exempts only the contracts of employees similar in nature to "seamen and railroad employees."136 In
other words, § 1 exempts only workers actually engaged in the
transportation aspect of interstate commerce. 137
Consequently, Adams's employment contract fell within
the ambit of the F AA.138 Pursuant to the FAA and the Circuit
City DRA, Adams's claims were subject to compelled arbitration, "save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity for the
revocation of any contract. "139 Moreover, the Court stated, "arbitration agreements can be enforced without contravening the
policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific
protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law."14o
Adams II makes clear that employers whose business activities
touch interstate commerce may invoke the FAA to compel employees to arbitrate claims covered by the employers' arbitration agreements, including statutory employment discrimination claims.141 Conversely, employers can lawfully decline to
hire prospective employees who refuse to sign mandatory predispute arbitration agreements.142

[d.
[d.
135 [d. at 114-115 (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTES AND
STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION§ 47.17 (1991)).
136 [d. at 115 (referring to 9 U.S.C. § 1).
137 [d. (referring to 9 U.S.C. § 1).
138 See id. at 124 (reversing Ninth Circuit decision that Adams's contract was
outside of the scope ofthe FAA).
139 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
140 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 123.
141 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition
any United States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in such agreement.").
142 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 123.
133
134
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The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Adams II is not
without controversy.143 The Court's opinion acknowledged that
various amici, including the attorneys general of twenty-one
states, objected to the Court's interpretation of § 1 of the
FAA. 144 The attorneys general argued that the application of
the FAA to employment contracts violates the presumption
against federal preemption in areas traditionally regulated by
the states. 145 In essence, the amici asserted that: (1) the law of
employment relations, particularly employment discrimination
law, is an area of traditional state authority; (2) states have a
strong interest in developing employment discrimination law
and in enforcing their laws in this area; (3) mandatory arbitration agreements frustrate the purposes of state civil rights
laws; and finally, (4) each state should be permitted to make its
own ultimate determination regarding the enforceability of
mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context. 146 The Court dismissed these objections as misplaced,
stating that the "proper target of this criticism" is Southland v.
Keating, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA
applies in state courts and preempts state laws that are hostile
to arbitration. 147

143 See, e.g., id. at 133 (Souter, J., with whom Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and
Breyer, J. join, dissenting).
144 [d. at 121. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of the States of California, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, lllinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia, in support of Respondent, Adams
(No. 99-1379), Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), available in 2000 WL
1369472. "Amicus Curiae" is Latin for "friend of the court," and refers to "a person who
is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file
a brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.
Plural amici curiae." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 1999).
145 Brief of Amicus Curiae of the States of California, Ariwna, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, lllinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia, in support of Respondent, Adams (No. 99-1379),
Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), available in 2000 WL 1369472, at *1-2.
146 [d.
147 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 122 (citing Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984».
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The U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Adams II that
Congress never overturned Southland. 148 The Congressional
response to Adams II, however, is not yet clear. Since Adams
II, various bills have been introduced in the House of Representatives, "to amend [the Federal Arbitration Act], to allow
employees the right to accept or reject the use of arbitration to
resolve an employment controversy."149 None, however, have
gained much support.150 Similarly, the California Assembly
Judiciary Committee endorsed a bill that would have "invalidated arbitration agreements between employers and employees that relate to employment practices covered by the Fair
Employment and Housing Act [FEHA], that are required as a
condition of employment or continued employment."151 Former
California Governor Gray Davis vetoed the measure. 152 Until
these legislators garner the support they need to amend the
FAA, the U.S. Supreme Court's determination that employers
may force employees to arbitrate workplace discrimination
claims remains the law. 153

II.

NINTH CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF
ADAMS II

Following its decision in Adams II, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted petitions for writs of certiorari for several Ninth
Circuit cases, and remanded those cases for further considera-

[d. (citing Southland, 465 U.S. 1).
H.R. 540, 108'" Congo (2003) (introduced in House of Representatives, February
5, 2003). See also H.R. 2282, 107th Congo (2001) (previous version introduced in House
of Representatives, June 21, 2001, "[t]o amend title 9 of the United States Code to
exclude all employment contracts from the arbitration provisions of chapter 1 of such
title.").
150 H.R. 540, 108'" Congo (2003), introduced in House of Representatives on February 5, 2003, was still in House Committee as of March 7, 2004. According to
www.westJaw.com. database BC (BillCast), H.R. 540 has a 3% chance of passing the
House Committee. H.R. 2282, 107th Congo (2001), failed to pass the 107" Congress.
151 A.B. 1715, Cal. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2003-2004 (Cal. 2003).
152 See Linda Rapattoni, Bills on Retaliation, Arbitration Vetoed, SAN FRANCISCO
DAILY JOURNAL, October 14, 2003, at 1 (Governor Gray Davis vetoed A.B. 1715, a bill
by the Assembly Judiciary Committee that would have barred employers from forcing
employees to arbitrate disputes governed by FERA).
153 See Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) ("arbitration agreements
can be enforced without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving
employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law.").
148

149
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tion in light of its holding. 154 Adams II was remanded to the
Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion. 155 In Circuit City v. Adams III (hereinafter "Adams IIr), the Ninth Circuit held that the arbitration agreement in Circuit City's DRA was unconscionable under California law and refused to order Adams to arbitrate his
claims. 156 In several other remanded cases, the Ninth Circuit
applied the doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate mandatory arbitration clauses. 157 These cases illustrate that even after Adams II, the Ninth Circuit remains just as unlikely to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements that are required as a
condition of employment. ISS In the wake of the pro-arbitration
mandate of
Adams II, the Ninth Circuit has consistently invalidated
agreements that compel employee arbitration, an end that neither federal nor state legislators have been able to accomplish.
The Ninth Circuit's post-Adams II decisions rely on § 2 of
the FAA, which allows employees to rescind arbitration agreements if they can show traditional grounds for invalidating
contracts such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.159 The
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 532 U.S. 938 (2001); Circuit City Stores v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. granted, 532 U.S. 938 (2001).
155 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 124.
th
156 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9 Cir. 2002).
157 See supra note 13 for a definition of unconscionability. See infra Parts II-A
and II-C for a discussion of cases in which the Ninth Circuit invalidated arbitration
agreements on unconscionability grounds.
158 CAL. Cw. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985) ("If the court as a matter of law finds
the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.").
159
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 892. Fraud
refers to "a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to
induce another to act to his or her detriment. In contract law, fraud also refers to
unconscionable dealing; the unconscientious use of the power arising out of the parties'
relative positions and resulting in an unconscionable bargain." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 670 (7th ed. 1999). Duress broadly refers to "the threat of confinement or
detention, or other threat of harm, used to compel a person to do something against his
or her will or judgment. Duress is a recognized defense to a contractual breach."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 250 (7th ed. 1999). Unconscionability refers to "(1) extreme
unfairness, or (2) the principle that a court may refuse to enforce a contract that is
unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during contract formation or because
of overreaching contractual terms, especially terms that are unreasonably favorable to
one party while precluding meaningful choice for the other party." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1526 (7th ed. 1999).
154
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Ninth Circuit held the arbitration agreements unconscionable
for primarily three reasons. 160 First, when arbitration agreements are a required condition of employment, employees cannot negotiate or reject the agreement's terms. 161 The Ninth Circuit considers such agreements to be procedurally unconscionable. 162 Second, because employers are unlikely to bring typical
employment-related suits against employees, the arbitration
agreements lack bilaterality.163 Such agreements are considered unfairly one-sided because the employee gives up her right
to have her claims resolved in a judicial forum, while her employer, who is unlikely to sue its employees, makes no recipro. cal sacrifice. l64 Finally, Ninth Circuit considers terms contained in arbitration agreements that restrict the employee's
rights under employment discrimination statutes to be substantively unconscionable. 165

See infra notes 161-229 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893 ("The [arbitrationl agreement
is a prerequisite to employment, and job applicants are not permitted to modifY the
agreement's terms-they must take the contract or leave it.").
162 See infra notes 166-229 and accompanying text for examples of cases assessing
procedural unconscionability in the making of arbitration agreements.
163 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893-894 ("the [arbitration agreementl unilaterally forces employees to arbitrate claims against the employer."). The
use of the term "bilaterality" in the unconscionability context should not be confused
with the more common usage of "bilateral" in the sense of a bilateral contract. A bilateral contract is "a contract in which each party promises a performance, so that each
party is an obligor on that party's own promise and an obligee on the other's promise."
th
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 318 (7 ed. 1999). In requiring "bilaterality" in an employment arbitration agreement, the California Supreme Court concluded: "Given the basic
and substantial nature of the rights at issue [namely, the benefits and protections the
right to a judicial forum provides], we find that the unilateral obligation to arbitrate is
itself so one-sided as to be substantively unconscionable." Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 117 (2000) (adopting the language in
Kinney v. United Healthcare Services, 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1332 (1999».
164 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893-894; Circuit City v. Ingle, 328
F.3d 1165, 1173-1174 (9 th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Circuit City's argument that the employer is subjected to same arbitration terms as employees because the only claims
realistically affected by the agreement are those employee would initiate against employer).
165 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 894-895; Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1171;
Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9 th Cir. 2003) (finding DRA substantively
unconscionable because it required employees to arbitrate statutory claims without the
benefit of a full range of statutory remedies).
160
161
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ON REMAND: CIRCUIT CITY V. ADAMS III

The Ninth Circuit's treatment of Adams II on remand illustrates how the court applies these principles of unconscionability to invalidate employment arbitration agreements. The
U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Adams II that Adams's employment contract is within the scope of the FAA.166 The DRA's
provisions for compelled arbitration are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or equity
for the revocation of any contract." 167 The FAA thus allows employees to revoke arbitration agreements if they can prove traditional grounds for invalidating contracts, such as unconscionability.16B In Adams III, Adams asserted that the DRA is
an unconscionable adhesion contract. 169 Because he was employed in California, the Ninth Circuit looked to California contract law to determine whether the agreement is valid. 170
Applying California law, the court easily found that elements of both procedural and substantive unconscionability
infected Circuit City's DRA.171 In assessing the procedural aspect of unconscionability, the court considered the respective
bargaining power of the parties at the time the contract was
formed. 172 The DRA was a standard-form contract, drafted by
Circuit City, the party with superior bargaining power. 173 Adams had no opportunity to negotiate or modify its terms. 174 Because it was offered as a take-it-or-Ieave-it prerequisite to Adams's employment, the court determined that the DRA was a
166 See Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (reversing Ninth Circuit
decision that Adams's contract was not within the scope of the FAA).
167 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
168 Id.
169 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 892. An adhesion contract is a standardized contract drafted by the party with superior bargaining power, usually the employer, which is imposed on the weaker party, usually the employee, on a take-it-orleave-it basis. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 113. Because there is no opportunity to reject
or negotiate the terms of the agreement, adhesive contracts have potential to be unfair
to the weaker party. Id. at 115. Adhesion contracts are enforceable, however, unless a
court determines they contain terms that are unconscionable, or "so one-sided as to
shock the conscience." Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Kinney v. United Healthcare
Services, Inc., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1330 (1999».
170 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 892.
171 Id. at 893.
172Id.
173Id.
174Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 5

100

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

procedurally unconscionable adhesion contract. 175 Adams III
makes clear that an arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment is considered procedurally unconscionable,
at least where the employer has a stronger bargaining position
than the prospective employee. 176
Turning from the formation process to the substantive
terms of the agreement, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
DRA was substantively unconscionable because it contained
terms that were "unduly harsh" or oppressive. 177 The Ninth
Circuit found that the DRA did not require Circuit City to arbitrate claims against employees. 178 It then held that "this unjustified one-sidedness deprive[d] the DRA of the "modicum of bilaterality"179 that the California Supreme Court requires for
contracts to be enforceable under California law."180 Additionally, the DRA restricted Adams's ability to fully vindicate his
statutory claims by limiting the relief available to him, requiring him to split arbitration costs with the employer, and providing for a one-year statute of limitations on the arbitration of
his claims.l8l Having determined the DRA to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, the court concluded
that the objectionable provisions "pervaded" the agreement. 182
Rather than sever the unconscionable terms, the Ninth Circuit
refused to enforce the entire arbitration agreement. 183
175 [d.
176 This is

illustrated by Ninth Circuit cases since Adams III, including Circuit
City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) and Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d
1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003). See also, Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir.
2002); Circuit City v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1106, 1108, n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding no procedural unconscionability where employees had an opportunity to opt out of the arbitration program).
177 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893 (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000».
178/d.

179 In requiring a "modicum of bilaterality" to enforce

an arbitration agreement,
the California Supreme Court explained: "Given the disadvantages that may exist for
plaintiffs arbitrating disputes, it is unfairly one-sided for an employer with superior
bargaining power to impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept
such limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee, without at
least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based on 'business realities ....
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 117. See also, supra note 163.
ISO Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893 (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 118).
181/d.

182 Id.

at 895-896.
183 Id. (noting court's discretion under California law to sever an unconscionable
term or refuse to enforce the contract in its entirety pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE §
1670.5(a) (West 1985».
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APPLYING UNCONSCIONABILITY IN OTHER CASES:
VOLUNTARY EQUALS ENFORCEABLE

Following its decision to invalidate the arbitration agreement in Adams III, the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of two
other Circuit City arbitration agreements. l84 In Circuit City v.
Ahmed, the Ninth Circuit initially reversed the order of the
United States District Court for the Central District of California compelling arbitration of Ahmed's claims under FEHA,
based on Craft's holding that employment contracts are exempted from the FAA's coverage. lS5 The U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Adams II.ls6 On remand, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration. ls7 Similarly, in Circuit City v. Najd, the court upheld
the validity of the DRA's arbitration provisions. ISS
Relying on one key factor, the Ninth Circuit distinguished
the arbitration agreements at issue in both Ahmed and Najd
from that which it refused to enforce in Adams III.ls9 Both
Ahmed and Najd had an opportunity to decline participation in
the arbitration program by mailing in a one-page form. 190
Therefore, neither Ahmed's nor N ajd's contracts were procedurally unconscionable because they were free to accept or reject the arbitration clause without risking their continued employment with Circuit City.19l Absent a showing of procedural
unconscionability by Ahmed or Najd, the court declined to address their arguments that the agreements were substantively
unconscionable, and upheld the agreements as valid. 192
In contrast to Ahmed and N ajd, Adams was required to
sign the arbitration agreement contained in his Circuit City job
Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002). Circuit City v. Najd, 294
F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002).
th
185 Circuit City v. Ahmed, 195 F.3d 1131 (9 Cir. 1999) (reversing district court
order compelling arbitration based on Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F .3d 1083, 1086
(9th Cir. 1999».
th
186 See Circuit City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198 (9 Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 532 U.S.
938(2001).
187 Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1200.
188 Najd, 294 F.3d at 1109.
189 See Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108.
190 See Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108.
191 See Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108.
192 Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1200; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108.
184
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application before he could be considered for employment. 193
The arbitration agreement was an adhesion contract because
Adams had to either accept Circuit City's terms, or reject the
entire contract along with the job. 194 Circuit City's superior
bargaining power is buttressed by the fact that few employees
are in a position to refuse employment because of an arbitration clause. 195 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit found the
DRA at issue in Adams III to be a procedurally unconscionable
adhesion contract. 196 The pattern established by Adams III, on
one hand, and by Ahmed and Najd on the other hand, indicates
that the Ninth Circuit will not enforce an arbitration agreement upon which employment is conditioned, so long as the
party opposing arbitration also establishes an element of substantive unconscionability.197

C.

PRESUMED UNCONSCIONABLE: CIRCUIT CITYV. INGLE

Similarly to Adams, Ingle, the plaintiff in Circuit City v.
Ingle, was required to sign an arbitration agreement before
Circuit City considered her employment application. 198 Three
years after Circuit City hired her, Ingle filed suit against Circuit City in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California. 199 She alleged claims of sexual harassment, sex discrimination and disability discrimination under
FEHA, and sex discrimination and retaliation claims under
Title VII.200 Circuit City moved to compel arbitration pursuant
to the FAA, but the district court denied the motion on the
ground that Circuit City unlawfully conditioned Ingle's em-

Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 891-892.
Id. at 893.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 See, e.g., id. (holding the arbitration provisions in Adams's DRA unconscionable based on findings of both procedural and substantive unconscionability). Cf Ahmed, 283 F.3d at 1199; Najd, 294 F.3d at 1108 (finding no procedural unconscionability, therefore declining to address arguments as to substantive unconscionability, and
holding the DRA a valid, enforceable contract).
th
198 Circuit City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9 Cir. 2003).
199 Id.
200 Id.
193

194
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ployment upon her agreement to forego statutory rights and
remedies. 201
The district court relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., which held that employees may not be required, as a condition of employment, to
waive their right to bring future Title VII claims in court.202
The Ninth Circuit, however, overruled Duffield. 203 In an en
bane decision, the Ninth Circuit disavowed Duffield and held
that no conflict exists between the purpose of Title VII and
compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims. 204 In overruling Duffield, the Ninth Circuit ostensibly brought its position in line
with other circuits, and with the U.S. Supreme Court.205 In reality, however, the impact of this decision is minimal. The
Ninth Circuit recognized that Duffield was called into question
by the U.S. Supreme Court's broad pronouncement in Adams II
that "arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA
without contravening the policies of congressional enactments
giving employees specific protection against discrimination
prohibited by federal law. "206 Since Adams II, the Ninth Circuit
has not relied on Duffield to invalidate agreements to arbitrate
Title VII claims. Rather, it has invalidated arbitration agreements based on state law unconscionability grounds. 207 The
Ninth Circuit's reliance on state law contract defenses to invalidate arbitration agreements is evidence that it has not embraced the federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements in employment contracts.

201Id. The district court based its ruling on Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens, &
Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that an employee cannot be compelled to
arbitrate Title VII claims). Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1169.
202 Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190, overruled by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton &
Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003).
203 Luce, Forward, 345 F.3d at 750-751.
204 Id. En banc is French for "on the bench," and refers to "a decision rendered
with all judges present and participating; in full court." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 546
(7 th ed. 1999).
205 Luce, Forward, 345 F.3d at 748-749.
206 Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001).
th
207 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9 Cir. 2002); Circuit City
th
v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9 Cir. 2003); Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th
Cir. 2003) (invalidating DRA found unconscionable under California law). C{. Circuit
City v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002); Circuit City v. Najd, 294 F.3d
1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding DRA absent procedural unconscionability).
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On appeal in Ingle, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of Circuit City's motion to compel arbitration. 208
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Circuit City arbitration
agreement was unconscionable under California law, without
relying on Duffield. 209 The court found that Circuit City's superior bargaining power precluded Ingle "from enjoying a meaningful opportunity to negotiate and choose the terms of the contract. "210 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow Circuit
City to rely on Ahmed or Najd to support its contention that
the DRA in Ingle was not procedurally unconscionable. 211 The
arbitration agreements in Ahmed and Najd were not procedurally unconscionable only because the employees in those
cases each had an opportunity to opt out of the arbitration program. 212 Ingle had no such opportunity.213 Therefore, Ar!rr,ms
III, rather than Ahmed and Najd, controlled the Ninth Circuit's
finding that Ingle's agreement was procedurally unconscionable. 214
Turning next to the question of substantive unconscionability, the Ninth Circuit found that the DRA at issue in Ingle
required arbitration of claims brought by employees, but not
claims brought by Circuit City.215 As in Adams III, this "onesidedness" deprived the DRA of the bilaterality required to enforce the contract under California law.216 Circuit City argued
that the terms of the agreement applied equally to its own
claims, but to no avail.217 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
only employees' claims are "realistically affected" by the
agreement because of the unlikelihood that Circuit City would
initiate an action against lower-level employees.218 Thus, "the
lucre of the arbitration agreement flows one way: the employee
relinquishes rights while the employer generally reaps the

208
209

210

Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1169.
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1171 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1532

(1997».
211

Id. at 1172.

212Id.
213Id.
214Id.
215

Id. at 1173.

216Id.
217Id.
218Id.

at 1173-1174.
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benefits of arbitrating employment disputes."219 In other words,
when employees promise to forgo their rights to a judicial forum, employers obtain an advantage but make no reciprocal
s acrifice. 220
Based on this assumption, the Ninth Circuit went a step
further in Ingle than it did in Adams III. The Ninth Circuit
held that under California law, arbitration contracts between
employers and employees raise a rebuttable presumption of
substantive unconscionability.221 This holding alters the usual
procedure under California law by which a party to an arbitration agreement may ask a court to compel arbitration pursuant
to the agreement and to the FAA. 222 A court following that pro219Id. at 1174.
See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83,
117 (2000) ("Given the disadvantages that may exist for plaintiffs arbitrating disputes,
it is unfairly one-sided for an employer with superior bargaining power to impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept such limitations when it seeks to
prosecute a claim against the employee, without at least some reasonable justification
for such one-sidedness.").
221 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174 (emphasis added).
222 CAL. CODE CIV. FRoc. § 1281.2 (West 1982) ("On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall
order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a)
The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist
for the revocation of the agreement. Subsection (c) provides in relevant part: A party to
the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.
For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an
action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to
compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition ... If the court determines that a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy
exists, an order to arbitrate such controversy may not be refused on the ground that
the petitioner's contentions lack substantive merit. If the court determines that there
are other issues between the petitioner and the respondent which are not subject to
arbitration and which are the subject of a pending action or special proceeding between
the petitioner and the respondent and that a determination of such issues may make
the arbitration unnecessary, the court may delay its order to arbitrate until the determination of such other issues or until such earlier time as the court specifies. If the
court determines that a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending
court action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c)
herein, the court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order
intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may
order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration
among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or
special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay
arbitration pending the outcome ofthe court action or special proceeding."). California
courts have held that CAL. CODE CIV. FROC. § 1281.2, subsection (c) is preempted by
220
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cedure must first decide whether the agreement to arbitrate
exists. 223 The party seeking arbitration must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such agreement exists because
the court may not compel arbitration unless ~he parties have
themselves agreed to arbitrate. 224 If an agreement exists but
the party opposing arbitration raises a defense to preclude its
enforcement, the court must then decide whether the agreement is enforceable. 225 The party opposing arbitration must
prove the elements of its defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. 226 Usually, employees challenging the enforceability
of an arbitration agreement must prove why it should not be
enforced. 227 Ingle's holding shifts this burden to employers to
show why the contract should be enforced. 228 Ingle instructs
courts within the Ninth Circuit to presume that employment
arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable
unless the employer can demonstrate that the effect of the arbitration contract is bilateral. 229

III. A POSITIVE APPROACH TO UNCONSCIONABILITY UNDER
CALIFORNIA LAW: ARMENDARIZ V. FOUNDATION HEALTH
PSYCHCARE SERVICES

The Ninth Circuit decisions to invalidate arbitration contracts on unconscionability grounds rely heavily on the California Supreme Court decision in Armendariz v. Foundation

the FAA. See Warren-Guthrie v. Health Net, 84 Cal. App. 4th 804, 811, 812 (2000)
("Section 1281.2(c), which allows the state court to disregard an arbitration clause due
to the possibility of inconsistent rulings, is clearly inconsistent with the FAA's general
mandate requiring enforcement of arbitration clauses . . . We hold, therefore, that
section 1281.2 has been preempted by the FAA if it is used in order to avoid or delay
arbitration of a contract dispute governed by the FAA."). The United States Supreme
Court held that "application of the California statute [section 1281.2(c») is not preempted by the [FAA) in a case where the parties have agreed that their arbitration
agreement will be governed by the law of California." Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989).
223 Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 14 Cal. 4th 394, 413 (1996).
224 [d.
225

[d.

[d.
[d.
th
228 Circuit City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9 Cir. 2003).
229 [d. (emphasis added).
226

227
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Health Psychcare Seruices. 23o It should be noted at the outset
that Armendariz was decided before the U.S. Supreme Court
definitively ruled that the FAA applies to employment contracts. 231 Furthermore, Armendariz was not decided under the
FAA, but rather under a state law equivalent entitled the California Arbitration Act (hereinafter "CAA").232 These distinctions are inconsequential, however, because the CAA specifically covers agreements between employers and employees,
and because the language of the CAA echoes the FAA's coverage provision. 233 Similarly to federal law, California law favors
the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements contained in
employment contracts. 234 Under both the CAA and the FAA,
arbitration agreements may only be invalidated on grounds of
fraud, duress, or unconscionability.235
In Armendariz, two employees filed claims of wrongful
termination against their former employer, Foundation Health
Psychcare Services, alleging they were terminated because of
their sexual orientation (heterosexual) in violation of FEHA.236
Before they were hired, both employees signed employment
applications that included clauses requiring arbitration of future wrongful termination claims. 237 Subsequently, both employees signed separate employment agreements containing
the same arbitration clause. 238 When the employees filed suit,
the employer moved for an order compelling arbitration of the
See, e.g., Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Ingle, 328 F.3d
1165; Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9 th Cir. 2003) (citing Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000».
231 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000), was decided August 24, 2000, compared with
Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), decided March 21, 200l.
232 The California Arbitration Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1982) ("A
written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy
thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
for the revocation of any contract."). Compare the FAA's coverage provision. 9 U.S.C. §
2 (2000) ("A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract." ).
233 See supra note 232. See also, Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 98.
234 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 97.
235 Id. at 114. See also, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281 (West 1982); 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2000).
236 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 91, 92 n.1 ("Same-sex harassment has been held
unlawful under the FEHA. ").
237 Id. at 9l.
236 Id. at 91-92.
230
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employees' claims pursuant to the CAA.239 The trial court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. 240
The trial court also found that several provisions of the agreement contributed to its overall unfairness. As a result, the entire agreement was held invalid. 241 The Court of Appeal for the
First District reversed the trial court's decision, severed the
unconscionable terms, and held that the remainder of the arbitration agreement should be enforced. 242 The California Supreme Court granted review. 243
The agreement before the California Supreme Court in
Armendariz required employees to submit all wrongful termination claims to binding arbitration. 244 The employer, however,
remained free to file suit in court. 245 The employees were first
required to sign the arbitration agreements before they could
be hired, and again later in order to keep their jobs. 246 Moreover, the employees had no opportunity to negotiate the terms
of the agreements. 247 For these reasons, the Armendariz court
determined that the arbitration agreements were adhesion contracts. 248 Given the "economic pressure" felt by employees engaged in job searches and hiring processes, the court found that
the adhesive nature of the arbitration agreements rendered the
formation of the agreements procedurally unconscionable. 249
In finding the agreement procedurally unconscionable, the
Armendariz court emphasized that most employees presented
with pre-employment arbitration agreements are not in a position to refuse a job because the employer requires arbitration. 250
Secondly, the California Supreme Court recognized the overall
benefits of arbitration to employees, including reduced cost,
expeditious resolution of claims, and informal proceedings. 251 It
239
240

[d. at 92. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1281.2 (West 1982).
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 92.

[d.
242 [d.
243 [d.
244 [d.
245 [d.
246 [d.
247 [d.
248 [d.
249 [d.
250 [d.
241

at 93.
at 91.
at 118.
at 114-115.

at 115.

251 [d. (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect,
1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 189 (1997».
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also warned, however, that such advantages are balanced by
disadvantages to employees, such as waiver of the right to a
jury trial, limited discovery and judicial review, and often, reduction of the size of employee awards. 252 The Armendariz
court also acknowledged that while voluntary arbitration is
favored in California, "voluntariness has been its bedrock justification. "253 For these reasons, the Armendariz court instructed
California courts to be "particularly attuned" to claims by employees that employers with superior bargaining power imposed oppressive arbitration agreements. 254
Before a court may refuse to enforce an agreement on unconscionability grounds, it must find that the contract contains
elements of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.255 In addition to being procedurally unconscionable, the
Armendariz court found that certain terms contained in the
arbitration agreements were substantively unconscionable as
well. 256 First, the arbitration agreements lacked bilaterality.257
The arbitration clause did not expressly authorize the employer
to litigate claims in court. 258 The wording of the clause implied, however, that employees agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of wrongful termination, but not employers. 259 In addition to lacking bilaterality, the arbitration clause also restricted the amount of the employees' damage awards under
FEHA, while no such restriction applied to the employer.26o
These "multiple defects" led the court to conclude that the
agreement was "permeated" by unconscionability, thus entirely
unenforceable. 261
The agreement in Armendariz was limited in scope to
wrongful termination claims, a claim employers typically would
252

[d. (citing Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect,

1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'y J. 189 (1997».
253 [d. (emphasis added).

[d.
255 [d. at 114.
256 [d. at 116.
257 [d. at 120.
258 [d. at 92. The arbitration clause signed by the employees stated in part: "I
agree as a condition of my employment, that in the event my employment is terminated, and 1 contend that such termination was wrongful ... 1 and Employer agree to
submit any such matter to binding arbitration .... " [d.
259 [d.
260 [d. at 121.
261 [d. at 126.
254
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not bring against employees. 262 Still, the court found that this
fact could not justify the agreement's limitation to employee
claims. 263 The Armendariz court stated, however, that an arbitration agreement need not require the arbitration of all claims
between employers and employees in order to be bilateral.264
Thus, the Armendariz court articulated a workable standard
for assessing bilaterality: an arbitration agreement is bilateral
if it requires both contracting parties to arbitrate any claims
arising out of "the same series of transactions or occurrences. "265 In other words, employers must agree to arbitrate
claims arising out of the employment relationship which employees are required to arbitrate. 266
The Armendariz court also considered whether arbitration
is an appropriate forum for resolving employees' workplace discrimination claims. 267 The threshold inquiry set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court asks whether the agreement to arbitrate a
statutory claim requires employees to give up substantive
rights afforded by the statute, as opposed to simply submitting
"to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum. "268 Accordingly, the Armendariz court held that employment discrimination claims under FEHA are arbitrable, "if the
arbitration permits an employee to vindicate his or her statutory rights."269 For example, the Armendariz court refused to
enforce the agreement at issue because it restricted employees'
damage awards. 270 The agreement limited the amount employees could recover to wages lost from the date of discharge to the
date of the arbitration award. 271 Under FEHA, however, em-

[d. at 120.
[d.
264 [d. (emphasis added).
265 [d.
266 [d.
267 [d. at 10l.
268 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
269 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 90 (emphasis added).
270 [d. at 103-104 (emphasis added). The arbitration agreement provides in part:
"I and Employer . . . agree that in any such arbitration, my exclusive remedies for
violation of the terms, conditions or covenants of employment shall be limited to a sum
equal to the wages [ would have earned from the date of any discharge until the date of
the arbitration award. [understand that [ shall not be entitled to any other remedy . ..
including but not limited to reinstatement and/or injunctive relief" [d. at 92,103-104.
271 [d.
262

263
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ployees can sue for an amount up to $150,000 in damages. 272
Similarly, the arbitration agreement at issue in Armendariz
precluded employees from seeking the remedy of reinstatement
to their previous positions. 273 Under FERA, by contrast, employees can ask a court to order their employer to reinstate
them. 274
According to Armendariz, the California Supreme Court
will not enforce arbitration provisions that compel employees to
arbitrate statutory claims without providing for the full range
of rights and remedies afforded by the applicable statute. 275 To
ensure that employees retain the rights they would enjoy if
they brought their statutory claims in court, the Armendariz
court endorsed five minimum requirements for the arbitration
of such claims.276 An arbitration agreement that contemplates
the arbitration of an employee's future Title VII and/or FEHA
claims would have to guarantee to the employee the following
safeguards: (1) A neutral arbitrator; (2) adequate discovery; (3)
a written decision that will permit limited judicial review; (4)
the availability of all types of relief otherwise available in
court; and (5) limitations on the costs of arbitration that are·
incurred by the employee. 277 In addition to providing these
272 CAL. Gov. CODE § 12970 (West Supp. 2004) ("(a) If the commission finds that a
respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice under this part, it shall state its
findings of fact and determination and shall issue and cause to be served on the parties
an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the unlawful practice and to
take action, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (3) The payment of actual damages as may be available in civil actions under this part, except as otherwise
provided in this section. Actual damages include, but are not limited to, damages for
emotional injuries if the accusation or amended accusation prays for those damages.
Actual damages awarded under this section for emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses shall not
exceed, in combination with the amounts of any administrative fines imposed pursuant
to subdivision (c), one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) per aggrieved person
per respondent.") (emphasis added).
273 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 103-104 (emphasis added). See supra note 270.
274 CAL. Gov. CODE § 12970 (a)(l)(West Supp. 2004) ("(a) If the commission finds
that a respondent has engaged in any unlawful practice under this part, it shall state
its findings of fact and determination and shall issue and cause to be served on the
parties an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the unlawful practice and to take action, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (1) The hiring, reinstatement, or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay.").
275 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 103-104.
276 [d. at 103 n.8 (limiting endorsement of the "Cole" factors to the context of
mandatory employment arbitration agreements).
277 [d. at 102 (quoting Cole v. Burns Intern. Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465,
1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997». The "Cole" factors include: (1) Neutral arbitrator. The California Supreme Court previously held that a neutral arbitrator is essential to ensuring
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safeguards, the terms of arbitration agreement must bind both
employers and employees. 278
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR EVALUATING CLAIMS OF
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE FUTURE: A COMPARISON OF
NINTH CIRCUIT AND CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT APPROACHES

Viewing Armendariz and the Ninth Circuit line of cases
together, three essential concerns emerge. 279 First, mandatory
arbitration clauses in employment agreements are adhesion
contracts that may be considered procedurally unconscionable
when required as a prerequisite to employment. 280 Second, an
agreement to arbitrate must be bilateral, or equally binding as
to claims brought by the employee and the employer.281 Third,

the integrity of the arbitration process. Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal.3d 807,
825 (1981). (2) Adequate Discovery. The Armendariz court inferred that when parties
agree to arbitrate statutory claims, they also implicitly agree to such discovery procedures as are necessary to vindicate such claims, including access to essential documents and witnesses as determined by the arbitrator. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 106.
The Armendariz court also noted that a limitation on discovery is one important component of the simplicity and expedition of arbitration, and assigns the arbitrator the
task of balancing simplicity with the requirements of the statutory claim. Id. at 106
n.11. (3) A written decision that will permit limited judicial review. The Armendariz
court held that an arbitrator in a FEHA case must issue a written decision revealing
the findings and conclusions on which the arbitration award is based. Id. at 107. (4)
The availability all relief available in court. An arbitration agreement must not limit
statutorily imposed remedies, such as punitive damages and attorney fees. (5) Limitations on costs of arbitration incurred by employees. The Armendariz court concluded
that when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment, it
may not require employee to bear any type of expense that she would not be required to
bear if she were free to bring claims in court. Id. at 113. The Armendariz court further
held that a mandatory arbitration agreement that covers FEHA claims impliedly requires the employer to pay all types of costs that are unique to arbitration. Id.
278 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 120.
279 These cases provide a good basis for comparison because the inquiry is the
same under the CAA and the FAA. See supra note 232.
280 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114-115 ("There is little dispute that [the
arbitration agreement is adhesive]. It was imposed on employees as a condition of
employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate."). See also, Circuit City v.
Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2003) ("because Circuit City presented the arbitration agreement ... on an adhere or reject basis, we conclude that the agreement is
procedurally unconscionable. ").
281 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 120 ("an arbitration agreement imposed in
an adhesive context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting
party, but not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences."). See also, Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174
("unless the employer can demonstrate that the effect of a contract to arbitrate is bilat-
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terms that restrict or limit an employee's rights or remedies
under civil rights statutes are substantively unconscionable. 282
These concerns are at the heart of the controversy surrounding
the use of mandatory arbitration agreements in employment
contracts-they need to be fair to the employees they are imposed upon. The following sections compare the approaches of
the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme Court with respect to these three concerns, and recommends the approaches
that best protect employees' interests.
A.

AVOID ADHESION CONTRACTS To AVOID PROCEDURAL
UNCONSCIONABILITY

The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Adams II will likely
encourage more employers to implement mandatory arbitration
programs. 283 Nonetheless, the Armendariz court and the Ninth
Circuit cases agree that it may be unfair to force prospective
employees to choose between securing a job by signing an arbitration agreement, or remaining unemployed but preserving
their right to a judicial forum. 284 In California, both the federal
and the state courts are likely to find procedural unconscionability based solely on a showing that the arbitration agreement is a prerequisite to employment. 285 Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit held that merely offering employees a choice of whether
or not to participate in the employer's arbitration program
might not suffice to avoid a finding of procedural unconscionability.286 Rather, employers must offer employees a meaningeral ... with respect to a particular employee, courts should presume such contracts
substantively unconscionable.").
282 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 121 ("The unconscionable one-sidedness of
the arbitration agreement is compounded in this case by the fact that it does not permit the full recovery of damages for employees, while placing no such restriction on the
employer."). See also, Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175-1180 (finding terms several terms restricting employees rights under applicable statutes to be substantively unconscionable).
283 See, generally, King and Edmund, supra note 10 (stating that many employers
are implementing mandatory arbitration programs in response to recent high-profile
cases upholding the enforceability of arbitration agreements).
284 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4'" at 114-115; Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d
889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114-115); Ingle, 328 F.3d at
1171 (citing Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893).
285 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114-115; Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at
893 (citing Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114-115); Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1171 (citing Circuit
City v. Adams, 279 F.3d at 893).
th
286 See Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1106-1107 (9 Cir. 2003).
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ful opportunity to decline participation the arbitration program.2B7 The employees' decisions must be absolutely free from
employer pressure. 2BB Because their approaches to this issue
are similar, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the California Supreme Court offers a definitively superior solution to this recurring issue.
The ultimate solution undoubtedly lies with Congress to
enact legislation giving employees the right to accept or reject
an agreement to arbitrate claims arising out of their employment. 289 This may prove difficult, given the lack of support received by bills introduced for this purpose at both the state and
federal levels. 290 Moreover, members of Congress resorted to
lobbying the Ninth Circuit to uphold Duffield's preclusion of
compelled arbitration of statutory employment discrimination
claims. 291 In a bizarre reversal of roles, fourteen members of
the House of Representatives joined in filing a brief as amici
curiae in support of their position. 292 These members of Congress appear to be asking the Ninth Circuit to accomplish by
judicial decision what they have thus far been unable to accomplish through legislative amendments to the FAA. As a
result, it is left to employers to correct the flaws that led employment arbitration agreements to the Ninth Circuit and the
California Supreme court in the first place.
Employers should stop making their arbitration agreements mandatory, and start making them voluntary and desir[d.
[d.
th
289 See, e.g., H.R. 540, 10S Congo (2003) ("to amend [the Federal Arbitration Act),
to allow employees the right to accept or reject the use of arbitration to resolve an
employment controversy. ").
290 See supra notes 150·152.
th
291 See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9 Cir. 2003),
for reference to Brief of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, George Miller,
Barney Frank, Dennis J. Kucinich, John Conyers, Jr., Robert E. Andrews, William D.
Delahunt, Harold E. Ford, Jr., Ron Kind, Edward J. Markey, Major R. Owens, Donald
M. Payne, Hilda L. Solis, John F. Tierney, and Lynn L. Woolsey, in Support of the
EEOC (Nos. 00·57222, 01-55321), EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345
F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003) (brief authored by David S. Schwartz and John M. True).
th
292 See EEOC V. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9 Cir. 2003)
for reference to Brief of Members of the House of Representatives, George Miller,
Barney Frank, Dennis J. Kucinich, John Conyers, Jr., Robert E. Andrews, William D.
Delahunt, Harold E. Ford, Jr., Ron Kind, Edward J. Markey, Major R. Owens, Donald
M. Payne, Hilda L. Solis, John F. Tierney, and Lynn L. Woolsey, in Support of the
EEOC (Nos. 00-57222, 01-55321), EEOC V. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345
F.3d 742 (9 th Cir. 2003) (brief authored by David S. Schwartz and John M. True).
287
288
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able to employees. By eliminating the adhesive aspect of these
agreements, employers will eliminate the concerns that arbitration agreements oppress employees and favor employers.
An employer who offers his employee the option of a voluntary
arbitration program for the resolution of workplace claims retains the ability to educate and encourage employees to take
advantage of the benefits of such a program. Employers may
wish to emphasize that employees often find it difficult to secure an attorney to litigate their Title VII claims, which generate high litigation costs but produce comparatively small damage awards. 293 For this reason, the employer's arbitration program may provide employees with the only feasible procedure
for asserting their claims. 294 Employers may further promote
employee participation by incorporating into their arbitration
agreements the other two crucial fairness concerns, (1) bilaterality, and (2) access to a full range of rights and remedies. 295
These steps will increase the probability that employees will
voluntarily agree to submit future claims to arbitration, while
reducing the risk of litigation over enforcement of those agreements later on.
B.

ADOPT A WORKABLE STANDARD To PROVE BILATERALITY

Adhesive arbitration agreements raise concerns that employers will insert terms that oppress employees while favoring
employers.296 These concerns are especially warranted where
the agreement requires employees to arbitrate claims against
the employer, but does not require the employer to arbitrate
claims against employees. 297 In this situation, employees alone
bear the effects of the disadvantages of arbitration, including
293 See Marshall, supra note 93, at 96-97 (citing Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for
Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Drsp. RESOLUTION 559, 563-570 (2001)).
294 See id. at 97 (citing Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in
the Debate Over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON

Drsp. RESOLUTION 559, 564 (2001)).

See infra Parts III-B and III-C.
See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 115 ("Given the lack of choice and the potential disadvantages that even a fair arbitration system can harbor for employees, we
must be particularly attuned to claims that employers with superior bargaining power
have imposed one-sided, substantively unconscionable terms as part of an arbitration
agreement. ").
297 [d. at 115-116.
295

296
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limited discovery and reduced damages awards. 298 Both Armendariz and the Ninth Circuit line of cases recognize that
"the doctrine of unconscionability limits the extent which a
stronger party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose the
arbitration forum on the weaker party without accepting that
forum for itself. "299
The Armendariz court fielded criticism that is also properly directed at the Ninth Circuit's treatment of mandatory
arbitration agreements. The FAA precludes courts assessing
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement from construing
the agreement in a manner different from the way nonarbitration agreements are construed under state law. 30o Consequently, courts may not target elements that are unique to
arbitration when assessing unconscionability in agreements
governed by the FAA. 301 The Armendariz court denied that requiring bilaterality in arbitration agreements singles out those
agreements for disfavor in contravention of the FAA.302
Rather, the court adopted the view that unconscionability may
appear in forms peculiar to arbitration, citing as an example an
agreement requiring arbitration of employee, but not employer
claims.303 The Armendariz court stated, "it does not disfavor
arbitration to hold that an employer may not impose a system
of arbitration on an employee that seeks to maximize the advantages and minimize the disadvantages of arbitration for
itself at the employee's expense."304 These arrangements are
presumed unconscionable unless the employer offers some reasonable justification for the lack ofbilaterality.305
In Ingle, the Ninth Circuit apparently adopted this reasoning in holding that arbitration agreements in employment contracts, at least when required as a condition of employment,
raise a rebuttable presumption of substantive unconscionability.306 The Ingle court specifically stated that its conclusion is
298Id. at 116 (citing Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1537-1540
(1997».
299 Id. at 119.
300 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
301Id. See also, Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 119 (citing Heily v. Superior Court, 202
Cal. App. 3d 255, 260 (1988».
302 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 119.
303Id.
304 Id. at 120.
305Id.
th
306 Circuit City v. Ingle, 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9 Cir. 2003).
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consistent with the federal policy promoting arbitration. 307 In
spite of this assurance, federal courts that apply California law
within the Ninth Circuit will find themselves in an awkward
position. The U.S. Supreme Court commands all courts to address questions regarding the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts with "a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration. "308 Yet Ninth
Circuit precedent is also binding on lower federal courts within
the circuit. 309 Therefore, these courts are required to presume
those same agreements substantively unconscionable under
Ingle. 310
The tension between these competing positions is especially acute where an employee is required to sign an arbitration agreement before an employer will consider hiring him.
Such agreements are sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court
and federal law, yet are also susceptible to an easy finding of
procedural unconscionability under California law as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit. 3u Of course, courts must also fmd
that the agreement contains terms that are substantively unconscionable before they refuse to enforce it. Employees, however, no longer bear the burden of proving substantive unconscionability.312 Rather, employers must overcome the Ninth
Circuit's presumption that such agreements are fatally onesided, even where the agreement purports to require arbitration of claims brought by both employees and employers.313
Thus, federal courts governed by Ninth Circuit precedent need
not overcome great hurdles to invalidate mandatory arbitration
agreements that are a required condition of employment. Indeed, if the Ninth Circuit approach is embraced, it seems likely
Id. at 1174 n.10.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
309 See, generally, 32 AM. JUR. 20 Federal Courts § 604 (2003) (Absent some direction from the United States Supreme Court, binding precedent for the District Courts
within a circuit is set by the Court of Appeals for that circuit).
310 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174.
311 See, generally, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(holding valid an agreement, required as condition of employment, to arbitrate ADEA
claims).
312 See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F .3d at 1174.
313 See, e.g., id. at 1175 ("even iflimitation to claims brought by employees were
not explicit, an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee ostensibly binds to arbitration only employee-initiated claims."). See also, Circuit City v.
Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2003) (adopting language in Ingle).
307

308
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to result in consistent judicial refusal to enforce these agreements. This result is incongruous with the FAA's stated purpose, "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements."3l4
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's presumption of substantive
unconscionability is arguably inconsistent with the FAA for
another reason. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA
preempts state laws aimed at restricting the enforceability of
arbitration provisions. 315 Ingle's holding distinguishes arbitration agreements in employment contracts from all other contracts by shifting to employers the burden of proving enforceability.3l6 Employers must produce evidence both that the employee agreed to arbitration and that the arbitration agreement
is bilateral, therefore enforceable. 317 Employees are relieved of
the burden of proving unconscionability until the employer
proves bilaterality.31B The Ninth Circuit is not in direct conflict
with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding because the unconscionability defense under California law applies to all contracts, not just arbitration agreements. 319 Ingle's holding, however, applies exclusively to arbitration agreements in employment contracts. 320 Under Ingle, the California doctrine of unconscionability operates in a manner aimed at restricting the
enforceability of these types of arbitration agreements. Thus,
Ingle's holding contravenes the FAA's policy of making arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts.321
The FAA's policy of enforcing arbitration agreements is
further eroded by the Ingle court's failure to explain how an
employer might rebut the presumption that its arbitration
agreement is unfairly one-sided. There remains some ambiguGilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9'" Cir. 2002) (quoting Doctor's
Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). See also, Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.9 (1984).
316 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174.
317 See id. at 1175 ("even if limitation to claims brought by employees were not
explicit, an arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee ostensibly
binds to arbitration only employee-initiated claims."). See also, Mantor, 335 F.3d at
1108 (adopting language in Ingle).
318 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174 n.10.
319 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) (codifying the principle that a court
can refuse to enforce an unconscionable clause or contract (with no specific mention of
arbitration contracts)).
320 Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1174.
321 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, n.12 (1967).
314

315
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ity on this point. On one hand, the Ninth Circuit held in Lai
that an employee may be compelled to arbitrate only claims she
has knowingly agreed to arbitrate. 322 Applying this standard,
the court invalidated the agreement at issue in Lai on the
ground that the employee did not knowingly agree to arbitrate
her Title VII claim where the agreement did not specify the
types of claims that would be subject to arbitration. 323 On the
other hand, the Ingle court rejected Circuit City's assertion
that the arbitration agreement was mutually binding, partly
because the agreement listed claims typically initiated by employees, not employers. 324 Circuit City included the list to provide employees with examples of the types of claims covered by
the agreement, as the Ninth Circuit previously required.
The Ingle court specially pointed out that even if Circuit
City were subjected to the same arbitration terms as employees, "the agreement is one-sided anyway" because there is only
a remote possibility that Circuit City would initiate claims
against lower-level employees. 325 Employers must prove not
only that the agreement on its face applies to employerinitiated claims, but also that the effect of the arbitration
agreement is biiateraV26 It will be difficult for employers to
prove that the agreement is bilateral short of actually initiating a claim against an employee and submitting to arbitration
for its resolution. Without a clear standard for meeting the
Ninth Circuit's bilaterality requirement, neither the Ninth Circuit nor lower federal courts will consistently enforce arbitration agreements.
In contrast, the California Supreme Court in Armendariz
articulated a standard for assessing bilaterality that effectuates the pro-arbitration purposes of the state and federal laws
favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 327 The
Armendariz court explained that an employer might establish
the requisite "modicum of bilaterality" by plainly stipulating in
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1303 (9th Cir.1994).
Id.
324 Ingle, 32B F.3d at 1174 n.B.
325Id.
326 Id. at 1174.
327 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 120 ("an arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive context lacks basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but
not the other, to arbitrate all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences.").
322

323
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the terms of the agreement that employer and employee are
equally bound to arbitrate disputes arising out of the employment relationship.328 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's elusive
requirement that employers prove their arbitration agreements
are bilateral in effect, a "healthy regard for the liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration"329 requires no more than a clear
statement that the obligation to arbitrate is reciprocal.
Requiring an affirmative, express stipulation that both
parties are mutually bound to arbitrate claims covered by the
agreement creates a workable standard to be applied by future
courts. Moreover, the standard can be incorporated into existing employment arbitration programs and developed in future
ones. Finally, as the employee considers whether to sign the
agreement, she will be assured that at a minimum her employer is bound along with her.
C.

PROVIDE FOR FuLL VINDICATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS

The third concern recognized by the Ninth Circuit and the
Armendariz court focuses on whether the arbitration agree\ ment contains provisions that will prevent or impede employees in vindicating their rights under civil rights statutes, such
as FEHA and Title VIV30 The approaches both courts employ
to address this issue differ. The Ninth Circuit takes a "negative" or reactive approach, striking individual unconscionable
terms from arbitration agreements as they reach the court until the agreement as a whole is rendered unenforceable. 33l In
contrast, the Armendariz court takes a "positive" approach,
adopting a series of affirmative minimum requirements that,

Id.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
330 See, e.g., Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 121 ("The unconscionable one-sidedness of
the fu·bitration agreement is compounded in this case by the fact that it does not permit the full recovery of damages for employees, while placing no such restriction on the
employer."). See also, Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175-1180 (finding terms several terms restricting employees rights under applicable statutes to be substantively unconscionable).
331 See, e.g., Circuit City v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1109 (2003) (holding agreement unenforceable in its entirety "because any earnest attempt to ameliorate the
unconscionable aspects of Circuit City's arbitration would require this court to assume
the role of contract author rather than interpreter.").
328

329
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when met, help to ensure the fair arbitration of important
statutory claims. 332
The Circuit City cases illustrate a problem with the Ninth
Circuit's approach. In a series of unrelated decisions, the
Ninth Circuit found that several terms of Circuit City's DRA
deprived the employees of the full range of rights and remedies
afforded by the applicable statutes. 333 These terms were held
substantively unconscionable. 334 By now, Circuit City should be
painfully aware of each invalid provision contained in its DRA.
Yet, litigation continues over the amended terms of Circuit
City's arbitration agreements. 335 If Circuit City is unable, after
many attempts, to draft an arbitration agreement that is acceptable to the Ninth Circuit, then it is surely a formidable
task for other employers to do so.
In this sense, Circuit City is representative of many employers who struggle to maintain enforceable compulsory arbitration programs, or who are considering implementing one.
The Circuit City plaintiffs are representative of many employees who elect employment and arbitration over unemployment.
According to Ninth Circuit precedent, however, these plaintiffs
remain secure in the knowledge that they may successfully
challenge their executed arbitration agreements in court. The
Ninth Circuit sends the message that employees should not,
indeed cannot, rely on their employers' arbitration programs to
fairly protect their interests.
The Ninth Circuit's "negative" approach does not cure the
root of the problem posed by the unfair restriction of employees'
rights. The Ninth Circuit identifies unconscionable terms in
arbitration agreements on a case-by-case basis. The court has
discretion under California law to sever unconscionable terms
in order to preserve and enforce the remainder of the agreement. 336 At some point, the number or scope of the offending
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4'" at 102.
For example, in Ingle, the Ninth Circuit held the following terms substantively
unconscionable: (1) statute of limitations; (2) prohibition on class actions; (3) filing fee;
(4) cost-splitting provisions; (5) limitation on remedies; and (6) Circuit City's power to
unilaterally modify or terminate the arbitration agreement. Ingle, 328 F.3d at 11721179.
334 See id.
335 See, e.g., Mantor, 335 F.3d at 1108.
336 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West 1985) ("if the court as a matter oflaw finds
the contract or any clause ... unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
332
333
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terms makes it impracticable to sever all of those terms, and
the entire agreement is held unenforceable. 337 Once the agreement is invalidated, it is not clear that terms not specifically
found unconscionable were instead affirmatively found acceptable, or whether they were even considered by the court. Employers like Circuit City will eventually catch up with the
court's "incremental rule changes," but they continue to run the
risk that the court will invalidate their arbitration agreements
based on alternative or amended terms. 33S
This approach leaves employers and employees with no
basis to compare "good" terms with "bad" terms, and no way to
save the overall agreement. For employers, the formula for
drafting an enforceable arbitration agreement remains opaque.
Prospective employees, in turn, have no reference to a framework for a fair arbitration program to inform their decisions to
accept or reject an employer's arbitration agreement. For these
reasons, the Ninth Circuit's "negative" approach breeds litigation over the enforceability of arbitration agreements. This
trend nullifies the advantages that parties attain by arbitrating rather than litigating a dispute, such as reducing costs and
saving time. The Ninth Circuit's approach also contravenes
the federal policy favoring arbitration by generating suspicion
about the adequacy of arbitration procedures and denigrating
arbitration as an effective method of dispute resolution. Finally, it leaves both employers and employees without an understanding of the requirements of a fair arbitration system.
For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit should follow the Armendariz court in adopting an affirmative framework setting
forth minimum requirements for the fair arbitration of statutory rights. 339 Though the Ninth Circuit referred to these factors in Adams III, it has never affirmatively endorsed their
consistent application. 340 These requirements include: (1) a
neutral arbitrator; (2) adequate discovery; (3) a written decirefuse to enforce the entire contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause .... ").
337 See id. See also, Mantor, 335 F.3d at 1109 (holding agreement unenforceable
in its entirety "because any earnest attempt to ameliorate the unconscionable aspects
of Circuit City's arbitration would require this court to assume the role of contract
author rather than interpreter.").
338 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 13l.
339 Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 100.
th
340 Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9 Cir. 2002).
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sion that will permit limited judicial review; (4) the availability
of all types of relief otherwise available in court; and (5) limitations on the costs of arbitration that are incurred by the employee. 341 By considering each requirement in turn, the court
will effectively assess the overall fairness of the agreement because terms that fail to meet one or more of these requirements
will be readily apparent. Patently unsatisfactory terms are
more apt to be viewed as severable from the rest of the agreement, assuming the employer made the effort to incorporate a
majority of the other requirements. This approach promotes
the federal policy favoring arbitration by resulting in the enforcement of more arbitration agreements.
In addition to promoting the federal policy favoring arbitration, adopting these basic requirements will protect the interests of both employers and employees. Employers likely
consider it advantageous to retain the ability to choose between
litigation and arbitration when it comes to vindicating their
own rights. 342 But as the Armendariz court noted, "a unilateral
arbitration agreement imposed by the employer without reasonable justification reflects the very mistrust of arbitration
that has been repudiated by the United States Supreme
Court."343 Whatever reasons an employer has for limiting the
agreement to cover only employee claims clearly must yield if
the employer desires to enforce the agreement. On one hand,
by incorporating these five requirements, employers can guarantee for themselves the preservation of their rights in the arbitration process. Thus, all employers forfeit is the unfair advantage they gain by retaining a choice of forums while limiting employees to arbitration. On the other hand, employees
will understand that by agreeing to arbitrate they are not losing the benefits of a judicial forum. Rather, they are gaining
the unique benefits offered by an arbitral forum.
Arguably, placing these heightened restrictions on the
manner of arbitration is consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court's oft-repeated assurance, "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 102.
[d. at 120.
343 [d.
341
342
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arbitral, rather than judicial, forum. "344 By affirmatively adopting and enforcing these factors, the Ninth Circuit will establish
a concise and consistent method of adjudging unconscionability
claims. Employees will gain confidence in their employers' arbitration systems, and will have a framework to assess the
fairness and desirability of arbitrating their future claims.
And employers will finally know what they need to do to establish and defend a valid arbitration program.

v.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration holds benefits for employees, but prospective
employees who are forced to sign arbitration agreements are
not likely to appreciate these benefits, particularly if they suspect they are giving up significant rights. Both the Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme Court recognize the potential
unfairness these agreements pose to employees. The Ninth
Circuit's approach to these agreements, however, tends to exacerbate the perception that arbitration procedures adversely
affect employees' rights. To remedy this problem, the Ninth
Circuit should adopt certain aspects of the California Supreme
Court's approach in Armendariz when assessing an employee's
claim that an arbitration agreement is unconscionable.
First, the Ninth Circuit should adopt the California Supreme Court's standard for assessing bilaterality, which requires the arbitration agreement to clearly state that employers agree to arbitrate any claims that employees agree to arbitrate. Second, the Ninth Circuit should follow the Armendariz
court, and adopt a framework of minimum requirements for the
arbitration of important statutory claims to ensure that employees do not give up any rights or remedies afforded by the
statute. By providing affirmative, workable standards for assessing unconscionability, the Ninth Circuit will balance the
preservation of employees' rights with a policy encouraging
voluntary arbitration as an effective method of resolving employment disputes.
The courts may only do so much to encourage employees to
take advantage of the benefits of arbitration. Employers wish344 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985). See also, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,26 (199\).
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ing to maintain arbitration programs should seriously consider
making employee participation in the programs strictly voluntary. Employers can encourage employee participation by making it clear to employees that the agreement is bilateral, or
equally binding on both employees and employers. Similarly,
by incorporating into their arbitration programs the recommended minimum requirements for fair arbitration of important claims, employers will be able to educate potential employees about the implications of signing the arbitration
agreement. This in tum will inspire employee confidence both
in the employers' motives in presenting the agreement and in
the employers' arbitration programs.
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